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Eco-pragmatism and Ecology:
What's Leopold Got to Do with It?
Amy J. Wildermutht
INTRODUCTION
As we know from fairy tales, it is risky to confront a giant.
It is even less wise to confront two giants at one time,
particularly the giants I have in mind, Professor Dan Farber
and Aldo Leopold. Knowing the dangers, I will not attempt
such a feat. Instead, I intend to examine some of their work,
paying particular attention to how, by drawing on both
Leopold's and Farber's work in combination, we might craft
better solutions to environmental problems.
Eco-pragmatism, Farber's framework for resolving
environmental problems,' is an effort to reshape environmental
policy by providing us with a new process for resolving
environmental policy issues. As important as I think this
framework is, and as much as I agree with many of its
principles and aims, 2 I think it wise to ask whether it is
sufficient for the task at hand; whether it alone provides
sufficient guidance to resolve disputes well, or whether instead
it needs supplementation to accomplish its goals. Might
Farber's approach, helpful as it is, be improved by drawing
upon ideas set forth by conservation great Aldo Leopold? In
particular, might Leopold's ideas about the overall aims of
conservation policy serve to better Farber's framework?

t

Associate Professor, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah.
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1. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM (1999) (detailing
Professor Farber's eco-pragmatic framework).

2.

Many have sung the praises of Farber's eco-pragmatism but perhaps

none as loudly as Professor J.B. Ruhl. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered
Species Act Eco-pragmatic?,87 MINN. L. REV. 885, 887 (2003).
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At his death in 1948, Aldo Leopold left a substantial body
of writing on nearly all aspects of conservation. At the center of
that writing was his overall conservation vision, carefully
pieced together after many years of development. The claim I
want to make is that Leopold's overall conservation vision, as
articulated in five of his late essays, 3 could and should be used
to supplement the tools of eco-pragmatism. I begin with my
understanding of Farber's eco-pragmatic framework. I then
turn to Leopold's essays and to an explanation of several of
Leopold's key ecological concepts, in particular, to the
exceedingly important concept that he termed land-health.
Having introduced Leopold's ideas, I next consider the benefits
of drawing his land-health concept into eco-pragmatism. My
concluding thoughts hint at some of the many ways that
Leopold's vision might be similarly put to use in improving the
implementation of current federal environmental regulatory
regimes.
I. ECO-PRAGMATISM: WHAT IS IT?
The pragmatic approach to environmental problems
according to Farber is an effort to construct a coherent
4
framework that will guide our environmental decision making.
The emphasis here is on the process by which decisions are
5
made, rather than on the achievement of a particular result.
A coherent framework, in his view, renders the process of
environmental decision making more uniform by using
6
available tools "to make intelligent judgments in hard cases."
It does not, however, require the use of a mechanical technique
7
to give simplistic and definite answers to complex problems.

3. See Aldo Leopold, Biotic Land-Use, in FOR THE HEALTH OF THE LAND
198 (J. Baird Callicott & Eric T. Freyfogle eds., 1999) [hereinafter Leopold,
Biotic Land-Use]; Aldo Leopold, Planningfor Wildlife, in FOR THE HEALTH OF
THE LAND, supra, at 193 [hereinafter Leopold, Planning for Wildlife]; Aldo
Leopold, The Farmer as a Conservationist,in FOR THE HEALTH OF THE LAND,

supra, at 161 [hereinafter Leopold, The Farmer as a Conservationist];Aldo
Leopold, The Land-Health Concept and Conservation, in FOR THE HEALTH OF
THE LAND, supra, at 218 [hereinafter Leopold, The Land-Health Concept and
Conservation]; Aldo Leopold, The Outlook for Farm Wildlife, in FOR THE
HEALTH OF THE LAND, supra, at 213 [hereinafter Leopold, The Outlook for
Farm Wildlife].
4. See FARBER, supra note 1, at 11.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 70-71.
7. Id. at 10.
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Nor does it use those tools as ends in and of themselves. 8 For
example, under this approach, "economic analysis is useful, but
Likewise, we do not rely "merely on
not controlling."9
intuition," but do keep in mind that "[h]ard policy decisions
can't be programmed into a spreadsheet." 0
Several core tools, principles, and observations supply the
framework of eco-pragmatism. Cost-benefit analysis is one
useful tool, particularly for "resolving certain disputes about
how to allocate resources." 1 But "[w]illingness to pay does not
come close to capturing all environmental values, and it would
12
be foolish to base environmental law solely on this standard."
On the other hand, political institutions allow forums for
"deliberating about collective values," which is valuable since
"markets cannot determine the appropriate level of public
goods."' 3 Yet like markets, politics too often provides "a blurry
14
and sometimes distorted view of our society's judgments."
Indeed, the use of feasibility analysis-avoiding risks whenever
feasible-is a tool that allows us to give greater weight to
environmental benefits, but again should not be the only
15
method employed when making an environmental decision.
Thus, in the end, we consider both politics and economics, as
reflected in environmental statutes and the market
respectively, in the process of making a decision. 16 As for the
weight to give to each method, Farber suggests a hybrid
approach: apply a feasibility analysis, but use cost-benefit
7
analysis as a benchmark for what is feasible.'
Several other ideas play important roles in this framework.
First, there is what Farber refers to as the environmental
baseline, which is a general presumption in favor of
environmental protection.' 8 This presumption counsels that all
significant risks should be abated unless the costs of doing so
far outweigh the benefits. 19 Following logically from this
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 65.
See id. at 72-73.
See id. at 68-69.
Id. at 116.
See id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
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presumption is a green canon of interpretation, 20 based in part
on the goals provided in the National Environmental Protection
Act, 2 1 as well as a requirement that judicial discretion be
environmentally friendly22-for instance, favoring injunctions
when parties violate environmental statutes. 2 3
Because
environmental problems often extend into the future, we should
use relatively low discount rates to avoid improperly favoring
24
the present or near future over the more distant future.
Moreover, it is useful, Farber advises, to employ a stewardship
ethic to illustrate our responsibility to future generations. 25 In
26
addition to all of this, we need a dynamic regulatory system.
Such a system would allow us to learn from our mistakes by
allowing administrative systems to be more responsive and
flexible, rather than requiring a system to make its decision
perfect. 27 We might also revise the present environmental
28
statutes such that they are no longer as rigid and inflexible.
In the end, the guidelines for eco-pragmatism are:
" When a reasonably ascertainable risk reaches a
significant level, take all feasible steps to abate it except
when the costs of doing so would clearly overwhelm any
potential benefits.
Meanwhile, take prudent precautions against uncharted, but potentially serious,
risks.
• Take a long-range view. Use low discount rates,
maintain the responsibility of the current generation to
ensure a liveable future, and treat the preservation of
nature as an opportunity for long-term social saving.
* Keep in mind the uncertainty surrounding many
environmental problems. Adopt coping strategies such
as burden-shifting rules, postponement of irreversible
decisions, and (when appropriate because of new
information) deregulation.

20.
21.

See id. at 123-27.
See id. at 125-27.

22. Id. at 30.
23.
24.

See id. at 127-30.
Id. at 150.
See generally id.

at 133-50 (exploring the use of

discounting in the context of environmental cost-benefit analysis).
25. See id.
26. See id.
regulation).
27. See id.
28. See id.

at 160-61.
at 163-98 (developing the concept of dynamic environmental
at 179-80, 188.
at 193-96.
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Overall, keep a sense of balance, while maintaining a
firm commitment to environmentalism.
Don't put
economists in charge of the regulatory process, but take
their views seriously as a reality check on overzealous
29
regulation.
II. THE PILGRIM LEOPOLD
While Farber has laid out a comprehensive and workable
framework, it would seem worthwhile to put it to the Aldo
Leopold test. That is, it would seem useful to identify and
study the similarities and differences between the approach of
Leopold and that of Farber, asking in the process, Are there
elements of Leopold's thought that might usefully be added to
the eco-pragmatic framework to make it even more valuable for
the work that lies ahead? To perform the task, I draw upon
five of Leopold's mature essays, 30 selected from the more than
300 pieces by him published during his lifetime or since.
Leopold "was among the first observers to tell us in
scientific detail that our seemingly robust land is ailing, and no
one has told us more convincingly." 3' Even more importantly,
Leopold left us with more than a tally of the harms-he left us
32
with a "vision of remedies."
Leopold began his career as a ranger in the United States
Forest Service in the Southwest. 33 He later returned to the
Midwest, the region of his birth, to work in the Forest Products
Laboratory in Madison, Wisconsin. 34 When he quit the Forest
Service in 1928, Leopold began to work as a game
conservationist, which included taking surveys of game in
29.

Id. at 201-02.

30. See supra note 3. I have selected these five essays for several reasons.
Most importantly, these essays reflect Leopold's later, more developed thought
on ecology. In addition, all five essays focus on Leopold's land-health concept,
not to be confused with Leopold's well-known land ethic.
I leave the
explanation and defense of the land ethic to others. See, e.g., J. Baird
Callicott, From the Balance of Nature to the Flux of Nature: The Land Ethic in
a Time of Change, in ALDO LEOPOLD AND THE ECOLOGICAL CONSCIENCE 91,

91-104 (Richard L. Knight & Suzanne Riedel eds., 2002); Eric T. Freyfogle, A
Sand County Almanac at 50: Leopold in the New Century, 30 ELR 10058,
10063-64 (2000).
31. Scott Russell Sanders, Foreword: Reading Leopold, in FOR THE

HEALTH OF THE LAND, supra note 3, at xv-xvi.
32. Id. at xviii.
33. See J. Baird Callicott & Eric T. Freyfogle, Introduction, in FOR THE
HEALTH OF THE LAND, supra note 3, at 3, 14.

34.

See id. at 6.
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several Midwestern states. 35 This work led to Leopold's
appointment as the nation's first Professor of Game
Management in the Department of Agricultural Economics at
the University of Wisconsin. 36 Through the lens of game
management-that is, through his thinking and writing on the
"restoration and management of 'farm game' populations" 37Leopold realized that "it was not game that required
management but the habitat where game lived." 38 Thus began
Leopold's journey, a journey that resulted in some of the most
important observations ever recorded about sick and healthy
land.
It was on his "worn-out eighty-acre farm"39 near
Madison, Wisconsin, that Leopold undertook much of the
observing and experimenting that led to these ideas.
So we begin with Leopold, the "farm game" manager, and
his thoughts, written in 1939, on farmers as conservationists:
"Conservation means harmony between men and land."40 He
asserted, "When land does well for its owner, the owner does
well by his land; when both end up better by reason of their
partnership, we have conservation. When one or the other
grows poorer, we do not."4 1 In applying this wisdom, it was not
enough, in Leopold's view, that farms were producing good
yields of crops, for even a high-yielding farm could display signs
of decline:
The fertile productive farm is regarded as a success, even though it
has lost most of its native plants and animals .... What is the nature

of the process by which men destroy land? What kind of events made
it possible for that much-quoted old-timer to say: "You can't tell me
about farming; I've worn out three farms already and this is my

fourth?"

42

Leopold, analogizing to a bank account, suggested that
farmers were drawing more than the interest and, not
surprisingly, the principal was dwindling--"the soil bank is
tottering,"43 the interest from the woodlot bank is being
overdrawn, the wildlife and fish populations are being

35.
36.
37.

See id. at 8.
See id. at 9.
Id. at 4.

38.

Id. at 23.

39.
40.
41.

Id. at 7.
Leopold, The Farmeras a Conservationist,supra note 3, at 161.
Id.

42.

Id. at 162.

43.

Id. at 163.
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decimated. 44 According to Leopold, this loss was the result of
45 which in
the "disordering of waters by erosion and pollution,"
46
turn was the result of "awkward land-use."
Leopold suggested a remedy, but it would not be easy:
"Conservation, then, is keeping the resource in working order,
as well as preventing overuse. Resources may get out of order
before they are exhausted, sometimes while they are still
abundant. Conservation, therefore, is a positive exercise of
skill and insight, not merely a negative exercise of abstinence
or caution." 47 This kind of sensitive, attentive conservation,
Leopold believed, could not be done by the Government, at least
not on private lands where the Government could only act by
regulation or incentive payments.4 8 The individual farmer had
to become voluntarily involved. 49 Leopold offered several
suggestions for the farmer-leaving the creeks unstraightened,
allowing the creek banks to remain wooded and ungrazed,
having a good pond, keeping roadside refuges of prairie florabut he knew that, in the end, the choice was the farmer's to
make. 50
In 1941, Leopold wrote again of the need for farmers to
take action and again made his case in the context of planning
for restoring wildlife. He asserted,
The reasons for restoring wildlife are two: 1. It adds to the
satisfactions of living [and] 2. Wild plants and animals are parts of
the land-mechanism, and cannot safely be dispensed with. The landmechanism, like any other mechanism, gets out of order. Abnormal
erosion, loss of soil fertility, excessive floods and droughts, the spread
of plant and animal pests, the replacement of useful by useless
out of protected species are all disorders of
vegetation, and the dying
5
the land-mechanism. '

Leopold went on to say that "[s]cience, in short, has subjugated
land, but it does not yet understand why some lands get out of
order, others not."52 Accordingly, it is unwise to discard parts
of the "land-mechanism" since we may discover later that those

44.

See id. at 163-64.

45.

Id. at 164.

46.
47.

Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 165.
See id. at 168.
See id. at 171-75.
Leopold, Planningfor Wildlife, supra note 3, at 193-94.
Id. at 194.
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parts "contribute to the stability of the land."53 Leopold told us
again that the farmer is responsible for caring for the land, that
he "must be willing to use odds and ends of land for special
kinds of food and cover, and for water-retention." 54 He noted,
"Two or three per cent of the farm acreage thus devoted to
wildlife, plus the waste corners present on most farms, and
crop residues present on all farms, often spells the difference
between wildlife riches and poverty." 55 Importantly, Leopold
laid this responsibility at the feet of individual farmers, not the
government or the public at large, since in Leopold's view, the
public "always abuses common property."56 Nevertheless,
government had a key role to play because "[t]he function of
government is to teach, lead, and encourage." 57 To stimulate
the needed changes in how private landowners would treat
their land, Leopold urged rethinking and reteaching: "We must
undo the propaganda, brought to bear on landowners for the
last century, which teaches that the land is a factory to be
operated solely for profit. The land is a factory, but it is also a
58
place to live, and wildlife helps make it a good place."
Based on this work, Leopold drew together his ecological
and ethical understandings into the overall conservation vision
that he referred to as land-health. 59 He defined "land" to
include "soils, water systems, and wild and tame plants and
animals." 60 And he again defined conservation as "the attempt
to understand the interactions of these components of land, and
61
to guide their collective behavior under human dominance."
Leopold told us that conservation requires "the technologies [to]
accept as their common purpose the health of the land as a
whole" in order to stop canceling each other out. 62 It also
requires the use of yardsticks to appraise land-health. 63 For
this purpose, he offered soil fertility as well as the diversity of
53. Id.
54.

Id. at 195.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 196; see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243, 1246 (1968).
57. Leopold, Planningfor Wildlife, supra note 3, at 195.

58. Id. at 197.
59.
219.
60.
61.
62.

Leopold, The Land-Health Concept and Conservation,supra note 3, at
Leopold, Biotic Land-Use, supra note 3, at 199.
Id.
Id. at 202.

63. Id. at 202-03.
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flora and fauna. 64 He also told us that "[1]and is stable when its
food chains are so organized as to be able to circulate the same
food an indefinite number of times."65 Leopold acknowledged,
however, that science may never be able to write a formula that
will tell us whether land is or is not stable (that is, in his
terminology, healthy).66 The best we can hope for from science
is "to recognize and cultivate67the general conditions which seem
to be conducive to" stability.
Closer to his death, Leopold penned a relatively somber
appraisal of the prospects for achieving land-health. In "The
Outlook for Farm Wildlife," he explained that wildlife habitat
was being destroyed, in part by poor farming techniques, 68 and
that populations of both pest and native species were getting
out of hand. 69 The response to this destruction was not to
nurture the land's natural systems but instead to turn to
"[M]odern chemistry [which was] developing controls which

may be as dangerous as the pests themselves ([eixample:
DDT)." 70 Leopold also warned that the industrialization of
farming would lead to a situation that was "humanly desolate
and economically unstable." 71 The path to land-health, he
realized, would not be easy, if indeed it could be followed at all.
In one of the last essays written before his death, Leopold
not only fully explained his notion of land-health but also
provided a rough plan of how best to pursue it. 72 With respect
to land health, he wrote,
The symptoms of disorganization, or land sickness, are well known.
They include abnormal erosion, abnormal intensity of floods, decline

of yields in crops and forests, decline of carrying capacity in pastures
and ranges, outbreak of some species as pests and the disappearance

of others without visible cause, a general tendency toward the
shortening of species lists and of food chains, and a world-wide
dominance of plant and animal weeds.

With hardly a single

exception, these phenomena of disorganization are only superficially
understood.73

64.

Id.

65. Id. at 205.
66. Id. at 203.
67.
68.

See id.
See Leopold, The Outlook for Farm Wildlife, supra note 3, at 214-15.

69. Id. at 215.
70.

Id. at 216.

71. Id. at 218.
72.
73.

219.

See infra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
Leopold, The Land-Health Concept and Conservation,supra note 3, at
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As for Leopold's plan of action, it was, in his words, at
bottom "a plea for ecological prediction by ecologists, whether
or not the time is ripe." 74 Leopold was convinced that if we
waited until we had all the information, there would be no
healthy land left. 75 Drawing upon his own vast knowledge,
Leopold took the lead by providing his own best guesses as to
the "probable conditions requisite for the perpetuation of the
biotic self-renewal or land-health." 76 He recommended that we
"[c]ease throwing away its parts," "[hiandle it gently,"
"[r]ecognize that its importance transcends economics," and not
"let too many people tinker with it."77
As to the first of his recommendations, that we stop
throwing away the parts, Leopold argued that chain reactions
of unknown length can occur when a part is removed. 78 He
noted that "human predation by rifle is [not] the biotic
equivalent of wolf predation" 79 and that "extirpation is never
80
reversible.
On handling the land gently, Leopold encouraged less
violent conversions of land.81 Violent conversion of land, to
Leopold, included things like dams and lake outlet controls. 82
It also included a "violence . . . beyond water management"
found in the "reckless use of new poisons." 83 Leopold thus
implored us to use the land wisely, in a sustainable way.
On aesthetics, Leopold commented that "[t]he true problem
of agriculture, and all other land-use, is to achieve both utility
and beauty, and thus permanence." 84 Unfortunately, beauty
was not valued and thus not conserved by the farmer-it was
relegated to the state.8 5 Leopold stated, "We can thank this
subterfuge for our national parks, forests, and a sprinkling of
wilderness areas, but we can also thank it for a million farmers
who year-by-year grow richer at the bank, poorer in soil, and

74.
75.

Id. at 220.
See id.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 220-21.
78. Id. at 220.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 222.
Id.
See id. at 223.

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.
85.

Id. at 225.
Id. at 224.
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bankrupt in spiritual relationships to things of the land."86
Finally, with respect to the problem of too many people
tinkering with the land, Leopold alluded to the dangers of
excessive human density and argued that "it is unthinkable
that we shall stabilize our land without a corresponding
stabilization of our density."87
In other words, human
population must stay within the land's carrying capacity; if it
88
does not, both land and people will suffer.
III. IS THERE ROOM FOR LEOPOLD IN ECOPRAGMATISM? SHOULD THERE BE?
What, then, does Leopold's vision have to do with ecopragmatism?
In many respects, the concepts laid out by Farber resemble
Leopold's views. Both are of the opinion that we are saving too
little for the future and that we should take better care of the
land for future generations.8 9 Both are humbled by our
ignorance. 90 Both think it is important to have a vision of
healthy environments that includes humans. 91 And both would
rely less, rather than more, on economics for the answers to our
environmental problems. 92 Along with these similarities, there
are important differences. For example, Leopold is skeptical of
government as the solution to environmental problems except
93
on publicly owned lands; Farber is more optimistic.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 226.
88. See Stanley A. Temple, Afterword, in FOR THE HEALTH OF THE LAND,
supra note 3, at 227, 236-38.
89. FARBER, supra note 1, at 133-62; Leopold, The Land-Health Concept
and Conservation, supra note 3, at 219-20.
90. FARBER, supra note 1, at 165; Leopold, The Land-Health Concept and
Conservation,supra note 3, at 203.
91. FARBER, supra note 1, at 205; Leopold, The Farmer as a
Conservationist,supra note 3, at 172-75.
92. FARBER, supra note 1, at 122 ("[It seems to me, relying strictly on
cost-benefit analysis would not do justice to our community's values and would
to some degree trivialize our national commitment to the environment.");
Leopold, The Land-Health Concept and Conservation, supra note 3, at 220-21
("The biotic clock may continue ticking if we... [rlecognize that its importance
transcends economics.").
93. Compare Leopold, Planning for Wildlife, supra note 3, at 195 ("The
plan-wise adjustment is not primarily a matter of laws, appropriations, or
administrative devices, but rather of modifying land-use so as to provide the
habitat needed by each species. Hence the execution of a plan rests with
farmers and landowners, rather than with government."), with FARBER, supra
note 1, at 19 ("The premise of this book is that environmental law is here to
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But rather than catalog all the similarities and differences,
it might prove more useful to ask what, if anything, could be
added to the eco-pragmatic framework from Leopold's work?
The place to turn, in Farber's work, is to the point that
seems the most important and yet is perhaps the least fully
developed: his important concept of an environmental
baseline. 94 With this baseline, Farber makes clear that we
should favor the environment in our decisions, and he tells us
to do this by employing a "presumption in favor of protecting
the environment." 95 His proposals, from using cost-benefit
analyses only as a check on unreasonable regulation rather
than as the sole decision-making device, to employing a green
canon of statutory interpretation, 96 are all well taken. But
aside from specific recommendations, what exactly does it
mean to say we should entertain a presumption in favor of the
environment? What do we mean when we talk about "the
environment," and how do we measure whether it is in good
shape or not? And don't we need to know the state of the
environment that we are to protect in order to protect it? In
other words, how do we know what we are to protect? Ecology,
presumably, plays a role in thinking about the environment,
but is there some particular ecological model upon which we
ought to draw?
And what do we make of the vast
disagreements within the ecological literature itself, including
the rather fundamental divide between those who would have
us sustain ecological functions as such and those who would
have us focus instead on "keeping all the parts," as Leopold
phrased it, or maintaining as much if not all of the native life
forms that would inhabit a landscape if humans had left it
alone?
It might be helpful at this point to take a small detour. At
one point in his book, Farber suggests the use of his hybrid
stay. .

.

. It is now time to consider how to shape our regulatory system to

implement this commitment most effectively for the indefinite future.").
94.

See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.

Professor Farber

suggested in his keynote address at this Symposium that "eco-pragmatists
clearly do need some affirmative vision of what the world should look like,
considering the needs of humans as well as the rest of the biosphere." Daniel
A. Farber, Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism and the
Environmental Prospect,87 MINN. L. REV. 851, 880 (2003).
95. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.

96. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text (discussing cost-benefit
analyses' role in eco-pragmatism); supra note 20 and accompanying text

(noting Farber's suggested green canon of interpretation).
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approach-a combination of feasibility and cost-benefit
approaches that employs a "high value of life, conservative risk
estimates, and a low discount rate for future benefits"-in
conventional regulations or "at the industry or even global level
97
to determine the appropriate level of environmental quality."
He then suggests using "marketable permits and other
nonregulatory measures to implement that level of control."98
It is a provocative suggestion, and one that invites comparison
with the important work on conservation done by another great
in this field, the economist Herman Daly.
According to Daly, the mistake made by those advocating
cost-benefit analysis as the sole method for resolving
environmental problems is a misunderstanding of scale and
allocation.9 9 As he explains,
The micro allocation problem is analogous to allocating optimally a
given amount of weight in a boat. But once the best relative location
of weight has been determined, there is still the question of the
absolute amount of weight the boat should carry. This absolute
optimal scale of load is recognized in the maritime institution of the
Plimsoll line. When the watermark hits the Plimsoll line the boat is
full, it has reached its safe carryingcapacity. Of course, if the weight
is badly allocated, the water line will touch the Plimsoll mark sooner.
But eventually as the absolute load is increased, the watermark will
reach the Plimsoll line even for a boat whose load is optimally
allocated. Optimally loaded boats will still sink under too much
weight-even though they may sink optimally! It should be clear that
optimal allocation and optimal scale are quite distinct problems. The
major task of environmental macroeconomics is to design an economic
institution analogous to the Plimsoll mark-to keep the weight, the
absolute scale, of the economy from sinking our biospheric ark.100

Daly suggests here that economics is not the only game in town
because the market simply does not see scale. And because the
market does not see scale, we need to use some other method to
determine scale or, using his metaphor, to find the Plimsoll
line.
Daly's point is helpful in seeing how Leopold's work might
usefully augment Farber's eco-pragmatic framework and its
central concept of an environmental baseline. If we are going
to think seriously about environmental problems and possible
solutions, it simply is not enough to talk vaguely about a
presumption in favor of the environment. Far more needs to be
97.
98.

Id. at 116.
Id. at 119.

99.

HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH 50 (1996).

100.

Id.
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said. To provide guidance, the presumption needs to be linked
with a more detailed vision of the environment, a vision of an
environment that is healthy in ways that sustain humans and
the rest of the land community. Although eco-pragmatism is
focused on process, not results, 10 1 that does not mean we should
abandon all notions of what makes for a good environment.
Indeed, the presumption in favor of the environment is not
supposed to be neutral.10 2 It needs more teeth.
And so we return to Leopold. Leopold offers us a way to
think about ecological limits and environmental quality in
terms of a concept called land-health. 10 3 In Leopold's ecological
vision, land-health serves as the Plimsoll line. Land-health
provides the polestar for conservation work-and could usefully
serve as a guide to making ecologically pragmatic decisions.
Leopold summed up land-health as "the capacity for selfrenewal in the biota." 10 4 Healthy land, or stable land, 10 5 was
found where "food chains are so organized as to be able to
circulate the same food an indefinite number of times."10 6
Humans had modified prevailing food chains so vastly as to
bring about significant readjustments in the land
mechanism. 10 7 More often than not, these modifications were
unstable because the same food could not be recycled an
indefinite number of times. 0 8 The all-important fund of
fertility-the soil-was on the decline, and with it was going
the health of the entire land community: "Erosion, floods, loss
of species, and other land-troubles without visible cause are the
expressions of this instability."1 0 9
Leopold did not think that all land was fragile: "The whole
history of civilization shows land to be tough. Lands differ in
their toughness, but even the most sensitive took generations of

101.
102.
103.
104.
219.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
Leopold, The Land-Health Concept and Conservation, supra note 3, at

105. Leopold did not use the term stability to mean static. Rather Leopold
"knew that nature was dynamic and flexible," just as modern day ecologists
would tell us. Freyfogle, supra note 30, at 10064; see also infra notes 116-21
and accompanying text.
106. Supra note 65 and accompanying text.

107. Leopold, Biotic Land-Use, supra note 3, at 206.
108.

Id.

109. Id.
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violence to spoil." 110 But he was convinced that the changes
then taking place were happening too quickly and on too big a
scale.11 1 In response, Leopold suggested that we make less
violent changes in our lands, such as fewer changes in the
112
hydrology of a place and less use of poisons.
What is most important is that Leopold gave us a way to
envision our place on earth. Leopold does not merely offer a
view as to the right ecological limit in a particular setting;
instead, he gives us a vision of ecosystem health that can be
used in any place and at any time. Employing Leopold's
concept, we can measure our progress. Are there frequent
floods and droughts? Is there a dominance of pest species?
And all the while, in this vision, Leopold sees people, in
particular, farmers, on this land.
But some have asked, why Leopold? Why should we seek
guidance from a man who wrote over fifty years ago? Science,
particularly ecological science, has changed dramatically in
that time. Is Leopold still relevant today when we know so
much more?
1 13
My answer, like the answer of many others, is yes.
Today's ecologists tell us that nature is in a constant state of
flux. 114 And some have concluded that Leopold embraced a
static vision of ecology because he penned the now-famous
lines, "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when
it tends otherwise." 5 These naysayers then assume that
because we know that nature is not static, Leopold cannot be of
any help in our endeavors.
I challenge this conclusion on two fronts. First, one
familiar with Leopold's body of work understands that "Leopold
knew that nature was dynamic and flexible.""16 In fact, in
many writings, including his "The Land Ethic," Leopold
"expressly rejects the balance-of-nature idea and embraces

110. Id. at 207.
111. See Leopold, The Land-Health Concept and Conservation, supra note
3, at 221.

112. Id. at 223.
113. See generally Callicott, supra note 30 (discussing the currency of
Leopold's vision); Freyfogle, supra note 30 (same).

114. See Callicott, supra note 30, at 95.
115. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND
THERE 224-25 (1949).

116. Freyfogle, supra note 30, at 10064.

1160

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1145

natural change."' 17
Of course, this is not to say that Leopold was always right.
As Dr. J. Baird Callicott points out, "Leopold acknowledged the
existence and land-ethical significance of natural environmental change, but he seems to have thought of it primarily on
a very slow, evolutionary temporal scale." 18 Dr. Stanley A.
Temple, a wildlife ecologist, has further explained,
Leopold's skills as a naturalist were such that few errors of fact crept
Ecology, though, was still a
into his descriptions of farm wildlife ....
young science when Leopold wrote, and it is thus not surprising that
some of his interpretations of natural phenomena have been
supplanted by later ecological research.I' 9

Indeed, Leopold "guessed wrong" in a few cases. 120 But,
according to Temple, "His guesses for the most part were
remarkably correct (sometimes even prescient), and they have
withstood the test of time." 2 1 In other words, Leopold was
right far more often than he was wrong when it came to his
basic ecological understanding.
Second, and more importantly, Leopold's thought evolved
over time. His concept of land-health-the concept I suggest
ought to be incorporated into the eco-pragmatic frameworkwas his "foundational idea" and "he talked often and at length"
during the last decade of his life about this concept. 12 2 It is this
key concept from which we have much to learn. Indeed,
Temple has explained,
[Leopold's] prescription for healthy land is simple and straightforward: maintain the biological diversity of the land; use the land in
a sustainable, "less violent" way; recognize the land for its beauty as
well as its utility; and keep the human population within the land's
carrying capacity. Today, this prescription sounds a lot like the "new"
approach conservationists have been fostering under the banner of
arrived,
ecosystem management. Perhaps its time may finally 1have
23
more than half a century after Leopold first proposed it.

Leopold is thus not only still relevant; he still has much to
teach us. That is because we have yet to master what Leopold
was most concerned with, what he called "'the oldest task in
human history,' living on a piece of land without despoiling
117. Callicott, supra note 30, at 99; see also Freyfogle, supra note 30, at
10063-64.
118. Callicott, supra note 30, at 104.
119. Temple, supra note 88, at 231.
120. Id. at 232.
121. Id.
122. Freyfogle, supra note 30, at 10064.
123. Temple, supra note 88, at 238.
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it."1 24 With respect to this task, it does not matter that Leopold
was not perfect in his science; it matters that he offered a way
to master the task that, despite our many scientific advances
over the past fifty years, we have thus far failed to follow. 25 As
Professor Eric T. Freyfogle has suggested, "Were Leopold alive,
he would doubtless comment that 'land health' is simply one of
many phrases that conservationists might employ. He would
be troubled, not because his favored phrase has failed to catch
on, but because the underlying ideas largely have not, at least
126
in public discourse."
IV. AN ECO-PRAGMATIC EXAMPLE
An example might help to illustrate the role land-health
could play in the eco-pragmatic framework-an example drawn
from farming, which seems appropriate given Leopold's
intended audience when writing his essays.
As Professor J.B. Ruhl has catalogued in detail, farming is
the source of much environmental harm. 127 These harms
include habitat loss and degradation, soil erosion, water
resources depletion, soil salinization, chemical releases, animal
waste disposal, water pollution, and air pollution. 28 With
respect to water pollution, farms are major contributors of
nonpoint source 129 water pollution nationally, 130 and
agriculture is the most significant source of pollution affecting
the nation's impaired rivers, streams, and lakes. 13'
Most revealing for the task at hand is the specific problem
of nonpoint source pollution caused by farms. Following the
124. Id. at 236.
125. See Freyfogle, supra note 30, at 10067.
126. Id.
127. See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 274 (2000).
128. See id. at 274-92.
129. Nonpoint source water pollution is often defined in the negative. That

is, it is defined as that water pollution that does not result from point sources
or, more generally, water pollution that "does not result from a discharge at a
specific, single location." THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES AND READINGS 912 (4th ed. 2002). Nonpoint
source pollution is generally runoff from land as the result of precipitation or

snowmelt. See id. Common examples of big contributors to nonpoint source
pollution are runoff from agricultural fields and runoff from paved surfaces
such as parking lots and streets.
130. Ruhl, supra note 127, at 288.
131. OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW,
POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 85-86 (1999).
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eco-pragmatic framework, we would begin by determining
whether there is a "reasonably ascertainable risk" that has
"reache[d] a significant level."' 132 According to Ruhl, the harms
from agricultural nonpoint source pollution include a major
contribution to the hypoxic "dead zone," excessive plankton
production, the demise of submerged aquatic vegetation,
massive fish kills, and contamination of drinking water
supplies. 133 This appears to qualify as a risk that has reached a
significant level. So what do we do? According to Farber, we
should "take all feasible steps to abate it except when costs
clearly would overwhelm any potential benefits." 134 Ruhl has
offered several excellent suggestions in this area, including
requiring industrial farms to get permits similar to those
required of other industries, that would require the use of "best
management practices." 135 But we are still left with the
problem of determining which of the feasible options to choose.
A simple example can highlight the uncertainty here.
Suppose there are two ways to stop agricultural runoff caused
by twenty farmers whose lands abut a particular stream. One
option is to require the twenty farmers to take a sizable strip of
land along the stream out of production and return it to a more
natural state, such as a wetland. These wetland buffer strips
will remove nutrients and sediments from the runoff that
eventually enters the stream from each farmer's property. The
second option is to set up a system whereby all the farmers
construct a mini-treatment system, similar to a sewage
treatment plant, downstream from the farms to remove the
excess nutrients and sediments. Finally, let's assume, and this
is a big assumption, that the cost-benefit analysis comes out
roughly the same for both choices and that each reduces
pollution by about the same amount. Which should we pick?
This is a problem that the eco-pragmatic framework does
not seem to address. But Leopold does. Leopold tells us that a
farm's creek bank should be "wooded and ungrazed." 136 Why?
Because maintaining vegetative cover keeps land resources

132.

FARBER,

supra note

1,

at 201;

see also supra note

19

see also supra note

19 and

and

accompanying text.
133. Ruhl, supra note 127, at 288-91.
134.

FARBER,

supra note

1,

at 201;

accompanying text.
135.
136.

Ruhl, supra note 127, at 336-37.
Leopold, The Farmeras a Conservationist,supra note 3, at 172.
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from getting out of order and disappearing or deteriorating. 137
It helps keep the food chains in order, 138 or, as we might talk
about it in modern terms, it protects "the land's ability to
recycle nutrients efficiently and endlessly." 39 At bottom,
Leopold was concerned about ecological function.
And
ecological function is best protected by wetlands, not minitreatment plants.
Leopold also tells us that this is right because it is more
aesthetically pleasing. He believed that, although preserving
beauty may not make money, only where there is beauty will
there be permanence. 140 As he explained in a slightly different
context, "The reasons for restoring wildlife are two: 1. It adds to
the satisfactions of living [and] 2. Wild plants and animals are
parts of the land-mechanism, and cannot safely be dispensed
with."'141
Finally, Leopold would pick the wetland option because he
wanted solutions that would involve the health of the land as a
whole. 142 He wrote, "Until the technologies accept as their
common purpose the health of the land as a whole,
'coordination' is mere window-dressing, and each will continue
143
in part to cancel the other."
Embedded within this simple example is a bigger point: If
we follow Leopold's advice, we will begin to see that all
solutions to environmental problems are not equal. Indeed,
even treatment technologies that cost the same and remove the
same pollutants are not the same. And we know this because
some will positively contribute to land-health-improve
ecological function-and others will, at best, keep the land in
its ailing state, or even cause further decline. The two choices
here are not the same. We should not treat them as if they are.
But isn't that just an argument that we should be more
careful in how we pick the technology to be employed in abating
pollution? In other words, in Daly's boat example, aren't we
simply trying a different seating arrangement? In part, no
doubt, we are. But we are doing more than that: We're also
137.
138.
139.

See id. at 162.
Leopold, Biotic Land-Use, supra note 3, at 206.
Freyfogle, supra note 30, at 10065.

140.
141.

Supra note 84 and accompanying text.
Supra note 51 and accompanying text.

142.

See Leopold, Biotic Land-Use, supra note 3, at 202.

143.

Id.

This is not unlike the modern day calls for a multi-media

approach to environmental law. See Ruhl, supra note 127, at 336 nn.409-10.
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suggesting that the Plimsoll line should be determined and
respected in a different way than has been done before.
Leopold's ideas do more than tell us which treatment
technology to use. They also encourage us to step back from
how we normally set the Plimsoll line-the point at which we
are going to sink 44-and look carefully at the whole. Instead of
looking at discrete pollutants and focusing on the harm that
may flow from a certain concentration of a pollutant, we need
to take a broader view. If our goal is land-health or some
ecological variant of it, we begin to think in terms of a Plimsoll
line that is not a particular concentration of a given pollutant,
but rather in terms of ecological function. And once we see the
goal in terms of ecological function, the control technology or
pollution prevention method that is selected will reflect a desire
to reach that ecological goal, rather than merely to keep
concentrations of particular pollutants below prescribed
numeric limits.
To be sure, Farber's framework gets us far by giving us a
new and valuable way to work through environmental
problems. 45 But it needs more ecology. It needs a clearer,
more ecologically informed vision of a healthy environment.
And to fill that need there is perhaps no better vision to draw
upon than Leopold's concept of land-health, with its focus on
ecological function. 146 Borrowing from Leopold, Farber's ecopragmatism could include a principle of preserving ecological
function, which would stretch how we think about and select
the appropriate solutions to environmental problems.
But perhaps adding preservation of ecological function to
eco-pragmatism is not the end of the story. Professors Douglas
Kysar and James Salzman argue that "the environmental
debate generally takes place in the context of questions
requiring empirical investigation." 147 They claim that this
feature makes the environmental debate different than the
debate over capital punishment and abortion: "[I]f both bean
counter and tree hugger tribes could agree on the substance of
and confidence limits surrounding relevant physical and social
scientific knowledge, then in theory a significant amount of
144.

See supra note 100 and accompanying text (outlining Daly's Plimsoll

line analogy).
145. See supra Part I.
146. See supra Part II.
147. Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1118 (2003).
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disagreement over the necessity and desirability of
environmental regulation would disappear." 148 But Kysar and
Salzman doubt, for good reason, that a fact-driven consensus
will be reached between the warring factions in the
environmental debate. 49 Indeed, they offer several reasons
why the two sides of the environmental debate are unlikely to
agree, such as the ability to manipulate scientific information
in multiple directions, 50 the tendency of individuals to
interpret information in a way that reinforces their prior
beliefs,' 51 and the debate over the proper source for information
regarding the environment. 152 The most important of these,
however, is that "disputes over empirical knowledge can serve
as proxies for more fundamental disputes over values." 153 That
is, "environmental policies will never just be driven by the
facts," 54 and "reaching full agreement on factual issues may
require full agreement on the deeper, submerged moral and
55
cultural divides."
As Kysar and Salzman point out, there are those who
would disagree and argue that better science and better
understanding of science will lead to less friction between the
bean counters and the tree huggers. 156 But if Kysar and
Salzman are right, where does this leave the eco-pragmatic
framework even with a goal of preserving ecological function?
Given this predicament, Kysar and Salzman suggest that the
place for eco-pragmatism "is primarily where the rubber meets
the road-the actual implementation of environmental
policy." 57 That may be so. But perhaps eco-pragmatism can do
more than just work on a policy implementation level. Perhaps
the problem is that, knowing the fundamental divide that
exists as to how people view environmental issues, we have
failed to engage and involve large numbers of people in this
dialogue, thus continuing the existing standoff.1 58 In order for
148. Id.
149. See id. at 1119.
150. See id. at 1120, 1125.
151. See id. at 1120-21, 1125.
152. See id. at 1126-28.
153. Id. at 1128.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1129.
156. See id. at 1118 (citing Professor Dan Esty's argument that the divide
in environmental politics will lessen with better science).
157. Id. at 1135.
158. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, and Pragmatists,87
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anything to change, however, it may be that we must begin to
challenge everyone to be involved and engaged in thinking
about the environment. 59 Eco-pragmatism, it seems, could
furnish just that opportunity. 160 Again, I return to Leopold.
What is most important about Leopold is not simply the
sound ecological principles he endorsed. Indeed, the debate
over the precise contours of ecological function and how we are
to evaluate the "whole" will continue far into the future. It is
instead Leopold's ability to take these principles, integrate
them, and challenge us to imagine a better place for us that
makes his approach so appealing. As Freyfogle has argued,
Leopold's peculiar talent lay less in his detailed knowledge than in his
unmatched ability to integrate, to bring together, to nourish and heal,
to imagine that long-term path toward fusion. As people skilled in
the opposite, in tearing down, fragmenting, discarding,
degrading,
161
and criticizing, we need Leopold as much as ever.

It is Leopold's dare to be better that is the strength of his
message:
Leopold understood what a radical claim [he was making] in a society
that sees land purely as real estate. He knew that neither fear nor
scolding would move us to make such a profound change in our views
of land and our ways of living, nor would logic, nor would law. We
would be moved only by affection, by wonder, by joy in the presence of
162
wildness ....

And Leopold saw this as a task for everyone, everywhere:
Aldo Leopold had a dream, and it remains as inspiring as ever. It was
MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2003).

159. My suggestion is not that we rely on the fact that pragmatism tends to
be more consistent with beliefs and values that are widely shared in our
society. See id. at 1094. Instead, I am suggesting that we engage and involve
more voices in the debate.
160. Professor Lisa Heinzerling has argued that, in her view, "[a]
pragmatic environmentalism would be a transformative environmentalism,
one that would not shrink from encouraging adjustments, even radical
adjustments, in human attitudes, habits, and behavior." Lisa Heinzerling,
Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1421, 1446 (2000)
(book review). She concludes, however, by stating, "[Pragmatism] is just too
calculating, too timid a word for the experiential, contextual, skeptical, and
most of all transformative attitude I have in mind." Id. at 1447. Although
Heinzerling's argument is persuasive, I am not yet ready to give up on
pragmatism. Indeed, my sense is that the inclusion of some of Leopold's
guidance may do to pragmatism what Heinzerling thought was not possible.
My approach to eco-pragmatism therefore seems to mirror what Professor
Christopher H. Schroeder has described as "a way for the [environmentalists]
who wish to engage in policy debates to navigate the political pluralism of our
modern society." Schroeder, supra note 158, at 1073.
161. Freyfogle, supra note 30, at 10067.
162. Sanders, supra note 31, at xix.

2003]

WHATS LEOPOLD GOT TO DO WITH IT?

1167

a dream in which conservation-the conservation of the entire land
community-was fostered not just in national parks, wilderness
areas, and other public domains but in every corner of every
landscape. It was a dream in which conservation became a down-toearth endeavor for all users of the land-for all farmers, as he called
them; an endeavor pursued in every watershed, in every forest and
field, on the back forty, even in the backyard-in every place where
people lived on the land and helped guide its unfolding self'
renewal. 63

One fear, however, is that by including Leopold's bold
vision of land-health and his imagination in eco-pragmatism,
the best of eco-pragmatism is lost. That is, if eco-pragmatism is
a pluralistic approach that seeks to have a myriad of
viewpoints and values expressed, including land-health in the
equation has put a thumb on the scale in favor of Farber's treehuggers. There are two responses to this. First, as Farber
164
explains, eco-pragmatism needs an environmental baseline.
Although one could argue that leaving the baseline without
definition has some advantages, such a choice would seem to
make the debate over any solution to a problem difficult.
Indeed, if we cannot agree on a desirable environmental goal, it
is tricky to argue that there is any environmental problem that
needs solving. One could likewise argue for some other
measure to serve as the baseline. 165 As I have argued above,
however, Leopold's land-health concept makes sense because it
is ecologically sound-more ecological function is better than
less; looking to the whole is better than assessing individual
parts. 166
Second, the land-health concept is flexible. Just as Leopold
does not dictate a particular means to the desired end of
healthy, functioning land, inclusion of land-health in the ecopragmatic framework does not require any particular means to
be employed to solve a particular environmental problem.
Accordingly, setting land-health as the baseline does not
fundamentally alter the eco-pragmatic framework; it merely
gives meaning to a term in need of definition.

163. Callicott & Freyfogle, supra note 33, at 25-26.
164. See FARBER, supra note 1, at 94.
165. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-pragmatic
Challenges of Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1191 n.80, 1191-94
(2003) (arguing in favor of "simulated naturalness" for ecosystem revival
projects).
166. See supra text accompanying note 145.
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V. BEYOND THE ECO-PRAGMATIC FRAMEWORK
Not only should Leopold's land-health concept be included
in the eco-pragmatic framework, it could usefully inform the
interpretation and administration of most federal environmental statutes. 167 For example, under the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 168 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is vested
with the authority to determine the effluent limitations that
must be met by point sources, based on appropriate pollution
control technology. 169 These limitations are determined in
accordance with section 304 of the CWA, 170 which requires the
EPA to promulgate regulations after considering several
factors, including the characteristics of particular pollutants
and the degree of effluent reduction that can be achieved by
control measures and practices. 17 1 In selecting a particular
measure or practice, the EPA must provide guidance as to how
it picks the best from the potential options available. The
statute requires that the EPA consider such things as "the age
of the equipment and facilities involved, the process employed,
the engineering aspects of the application of various types of
control techniques, process changes, [and] the cost of achieving
such effluent reduction." 72 The EPA must also consider "nonwater quality environmental impact (including energy require-

167. Cf ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, BOUNDED PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LAND:
ENVISIONING A NEW LAND ETHIC 39-48 (1998) (expressing the view that

federal environmental statutes and the implementation of them is not
grounded in an ecological vision); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Ethical Strands of
Environmental Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 840. But cf. A. Dan Tarlock,
EnvironmentalLaw: Ethics or Science?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 193, 197
(1996) (arguing that Leopold's land ethic is the "ur-text" for the current

environmental regime); Tarlock, supra note 165, 1177-78. Freyfogle stated,
Congress has tried hard to contain pollution as if pollution were an
independent problem rather than a symptom of something more deep-

seated. It has sought to preserve wild species and wild places, not
grasping that the more urgent need is for ecologically healthy

landscapes where people live, not places that people must leave
untouched. Congress has embraced cost-benefit analysis, as if our
past mistakes were matters, not of underlying values and visions, but
of simple errors in addition and subtraction. It has repeatedly spoken
of human well-being as the primary if not sole policy goal.
Freyfogle, supra, at 840.
168. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
169. See, e.g., id. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i) (requiring application of "the best

available technology economically achievable" as determined by the EPA).
170.
171.
172.

See id. § 1314.
See id. § 1314(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
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ments)." 17 3 Moreover, the EPA may consider17other
factors that
4
it deems appropriate in making the decision.
Although the writers of the CWA may not have had
Leopold's ecological vision in mind, 75 it would seem reasonable
for the EPA to take the commands of the CWA-to consider
non-water quality environmental impact as well as other
factors it deemed appropriate-and interpret that instruction
as a directive to consider ecological function, or, in Leopold's
words, land-health, when determining the best control
technologies and their resulting effluent limits. Indeed, as the
expert agency in this area, the EPA would be entitled to
deference with respect to its interpretation of the statute it
administers. 176 Accordingly, if the EPA began to consider as a
part of its analysis of the best control methods what things
cause the least disruption to the ecological cycles and systems,
it would likely select differently than it has in the past. Its
effluent limits would likely begin to take on a new look: less
numeric and particularized and more focused on the whole (i.e.,
multi-media) and on the land's ability to sustain the full
77
diversity of life.1
Incorporation of this principle is subject to many criticisms.
One such criticism is that the use of land-health as a guide
could lead to an increase rather than a decrease in allowable
concentrations of a particular pollutant. That is, in the simple

173.

Id.

174.
175.

See id.
See supra note 167.

176. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) (holding that when statutory language is ambiguous, courts
will defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of statutes it administers);

see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S 576, 587 (2000) (noting that
interpretations arrived at by agencies in settings that do not have the force of
law-such as interpretations in policy statements or enforcement manuals-

are still entitled to respect; agency interpretations that are the result of
notice-and-comment rulemaking or arrived at in a formal adjudication get
more deference under Chevron).

177.

Integrating this principle into environmental law should be the goal.

As Freyfogle has said,
If these guiding principles one day appear more visibly in the national

tapestry, they will stand out because they have been used again and
again, to repair tears and holes, to rework worn spots, to cover knots

and smooth out roughness. When enough new threads have been
added and we stand back for another sweeping look, perhaps then we
will see

that

the

law has come

understanding.
Freyfogle, supra note 167, at 846.

to reveal

a new

ecological
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farm example discussed above, 178 the wetland choice could still
be the correct one, even if the wetlands will only eliminate 70%
of the nutrients and the treatment plant would eliminate 90%
of the nutrients. To some environmentalists, this might be
troubling. Indeed, it is hard to accept at first blush that this
solution is good for the environment. But this is the correct
result because of the many collateral benefits that the wetlands
provide. That is, the wetlands will tend to preserve the land's
health by returning many important ecological functions to
that land beyond simply filtering nutrients. A treatment plant
cannot do much beyond removing the offending chemical, and it
certainly cannot, save in a very limited sense, restore ecological
function. When we shift our goal to land-health, we realize
that our current measuring sticks are no longer appropriate or
necessary. Indeed, it becomes all the more clear that our
current methods for dealing with environmental problems are
in need of mending.
CONCLUSION
Farber has offered a bold vision for working through
environmental problems. 79 This framework has been praised
by many, and deservingly so. 180 As Ruhl has said of ecopragmatism, "the term itself may come to signify an instrument
of decision making, the way people conceive of cost-benefit
analysis." 18 1 But the eco-pragmatic framework, for all of its
strengths, would benefit from the incorporation of Leopold's
land-health concept or something like it. With land-health
added, decisions about environmental problems will be made,
not simply with a presumption in favor of the environment, but
with a presumption in favor of a particular vision for the
environment, a vision that seeks to preserve ecological function
and that looks at the whole rather than the sum of discrete
parts.
Leopold, like Farber, 182 "recognized that we have to make a
living from the land, that we all need shelter and clothes and
178. See supra p. 1162.
179. See supra Part I.
180. See Symposium, The Pragmatic Ecologist: Environmental Protection
as a JurisdynamicExperience, 87 MINN. L. REV. 847 (2003) (honoring Farber

for his environmental legal scholarship).
181.

Ruhl, supra note 2, at 894.

182. See FARBER, supra note 1, at 205 (discussing the need to see human
society as a part of the vision of nature).
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WHAT'S LEOPOLD GOT TO DO WITH IT?

food."1 83 But we also need something more.
Leopold,
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According to

The true problem of agriculture, and all other land-use, is to achieve
both utility and beauty and thus permanence. A farmer has the same
obligation to help, within reason, to preserve the biotic integrity of his
community as he has, within reason, to preserve the culture which
rests on it. As a member of the community, he is the ultimate
beneficiary of both.184

Likewise, Farber tells us that
[w]ise decisions are not easy, but to decide wisely is of value in and of
itself. To cope with environmental challenges, we will need a society
that is attached to environmental norms, willing to take a long-term
perspective, and institutionally capable of making wise decisions....
realistic, it does not mean
Although being pragmatic means being
85
abandoning our hopes for the future.'

Most
Farber and Leopold have much in common.
importantly, they both urge us to make better decisions with
respect to our environmental problems and give us the tools to
do so. It is for us to begin that process, and we will be all the
better for it.

183.
184.
225.
185.

Sanders, supra note 31, at xix.
Leopold, The Land-Health Concept and Conservation,supra note 3, at
FARBER, supra note 1, at 206.
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